Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, PhD, Associate Fellow, ICS
The Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang district in Arunachal Pradesh from April 7 to 11 garnered plenty of media attention. One of the most prominently discussed questions centered around the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.
The Chinese side was unequivocal in not only objecting to the visit but also commenting on the reincarnation issue. The Chinese position, as encapsulated in remarks by scholars from important Chinese think tanks, is that the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation has to be approved by the Chinese government and selection has to be based on a combination of not just “historical rules” but also current “Chinese laws.” The reference to Chinese laws is with respect to the 2007 State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) regulation delineating procedures for the selection of reincarnated monks, including eligibility conditions, application procedures and the government and religious institutions to be approached for approval. The regulation basically excludes “any foreign organization or individual” from the reincarnation selection process, obviously in an attempt to legitimize China’s authority and exclude the Tibetan Diaspora (and others) in the selection of the next Dalai Lama.
The Chinese have consistently maintained that any reincarnation must be determined on the basis of the late 18th century procedure instituted by the Manchu Qing rulers of China. Under this “golden urn system” of selecting reincarnations, the names of prospective candidates would be placed in an urn, from which lots would be drawn to pick the real incarnation. Therefore, any other method being suggested by the Dalai Lama is seen as contrary to established rules and illegitimate, for it denies the Chinese government’s authority in the process.
Much of the recent interest in the issue was sparked by comments made by local officials in Tawang Continue reading “Political Embers Flare as Tawang Contends for the Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation”
Ravi Bhoothalingam, Honorary Fellow, ICS
A version of this article was originally published in Chinese as ‘中国为何应支持“印度制造”’ (Zhongguo weihe ying zhichi “Yindu zhizao”), 第一财经 (Yicai), 4 April 2017. This is part of a series by Indian scholars in China’s top business affairs news portal facilitated by the ICS. The Chinese version follows below the English text.
“Make in India”—a signature campaign of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi– was launched in late 2014 with the objective of transforming India into a dynamic global manufacturing hub, and thus radically enhancing employment and the prosperity of the Indian people. Just a few months later came an announcement from China’s State Council of “Made in China 2025”—a set of eight policy measures to re-orient the Chinese manufacturing sector in line with the country’s economic structural adjustment program. So, are “Make in India” and “Made in China” competitive programmes which coud drive another wedge between these two nations?
To answer this question, we need to understand the nature of both “Make in India” and “Made in China” more closely. Continue reading “Why China Should Support “Make in India””
Madhurima Nundy, PhD, Associate Fellow, ICS and Prof. Rama V. Baru, Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Adjunct Fellow, ICS
Demographic transition and population ageing are one of most discussed phenomena of the present times. China and India are at different stages of the demographic transition. In India about 8.6 per cent of the population are elderly while in China it is 16.1 per cent. Given the large population size, in terms of numbers, the elderly population is large.
Change in Family Structure and State Response
While the demographic transition is determined by the economic and social changes in any society, the transition itself has profound social, economic, psychological and ideational consequences for the individual, family and society. In India and China, the changing family structure, living arrangements and support services have created challenges for dealing with the changing needs of the elderly population. Continue reading “Elderly Care in India and China: Need for Comprehensive Policy and Planning”
Jabin T. Jacob, PhD, Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina state visit to India from 7-10 April came after at least two postponements. The difficulty in getting the visit to take off is a far cry from the warmth and cordiality that was on display in words and deeds during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Dhaka in June 2015.
Hasina’s reservations had to do with her fear of coming away from New Delhi without any agreement either on sharing the Teesta river waters or on constructing the Ganges Barrage on the Padma river at Pangsha near Rajbari, which is what has happened. The agreement has fallen through multiple times during both the UPA tenure as well as during Modi’s visit and despite Dhaka agreeing to major India’s major demands of allowing transit of goods to Northeast both from Indian mainland overland through Bangladesh territory and by sea through the Bangladeshi ports of Chittagong and Mongla.
The coming state visit will be Hasina’s first in seven years to India and it might be useful to compare and contrast the progress in Dhaka’s ties with China – India’s principal challenger for Bangladesh’s affections – in the meantime. Continue reading “Sheikh Hasina’s India Visit: China in the Background”
Kishorchand Nongmaithem, Research Assistant, ICS
In January last year, when the Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran, the two countries agreed to expand their commercial ties to US$600 billion in the next ten years. On that visit, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told Xi that, “Iran never trusted the West” that’s why Iran “seeks cooperation with more independent countries” (like China). China also welcomed Iran to work together under its ‘Belt and Road’ connectivity framework.
A year later in March 2017, King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia visited China, and during his three-day stay, the two countries signed deals worth US$56 billion that included 14 cooperative agreements and 21 other deals on oil production, investment, energy, space and other areas. Continue reading “China and the Iran-Saudi Rivalry: Towards a Greater Role?”
Jabin T. Jacob, PhD, Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies
Amid loud protest from Beijing, the Dalai Lama is slated to visit Tawang in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh from 5–7 April. The visit follows a public meeting with the president of India in December 2016 — the first in some 60 years — and a mid-March address at a major Buddhist conference in the state of Bihar, where the Dalai Lama shared the stage with India’s minister of culture.
Beijing’s vigorous condemnation of the visit presages a fresh round of tensions in the India–China relationship. Continue reading “Dalai Lama in Tawang: Religion and Politics in Play in India–China Relations”
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, Assam
His Holiness the Dalai Lama graced the Namami Brahmaputra River Festival in Guwahati as chief guest, on 2 April 2017, as part of a 14-day visit to Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Assam Governor Banwarilal Purohit, Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal and several state cabinet ministers received him at the banks of the Brahmaputra in Guwahati. The Assam Government and the New Delhi-based research think-tank India Foundation, jointly organized this particular event hosting the Dalai Lama. This visit combined with the Dalai Lama’s subsequent itinerary covering Tawang and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh lends itself to some questions about India’s China policy and in particular, the link between the boundary dispute and aspects of river-management and -sharing between India and China. Continue reading “Dalai Lama at the Namami Brahmaputra River Festival in Assam: Mixed Signals for India-China Relations”