ZTE sanctions withdrawal: Possible channel to address US stance on Iran Nuclear Deal?

Ms. Sunaina Bose, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

The United States Department of Commerce announced in the early hours of 7th June, that a deal had been stuck between the Trump administration and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment) withdrawing the sanctions previously imposed on it. ZTE, a Chinese telecom manufacturing company, was sanctioned in April for violating US laws and exporting telecom equipment which contained American parts to Iran and North Korea. The sanctions were announced amidst the already hardening US stance on the Iran nuclear deal.

Within a few weeks, President Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), leaving his allies across the Atlantic scrambling to save their ongoing investments in Iran. One of the implications of US withdrawing from the deal involve re-impositions of their unilateral sanctions which were withdrawn in 2015 as a result of signing the deal. These include secondary sanctions that prevent non-US entities, conducting commercial transaction with Iran, from accessing US markets and financial systems.

In an attempt to salvage the nuclear deal, the European Union has invoked the ‘blocking statute’, a 1996 regulation that prevents EU companies from following unilateral sanctions and laws of any other nation. The EU has also offered to create alternative financial streams to support the Iranian economy. India, one of Iran’s significant oil partners, has also declared that it will only follow the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations, and not unilateral sanctions imposed by other nations.

The remaining signatories of the deal maintain that JCPOA is still the best way to keep Iran’s nuclear activities in control while respecting its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and have hence extended diplomatic and economic support to the nation. Iranian officials have in turn issued statements deciding to remain committed to deal as long as their economic activities are intact.

However the Iranian economy, especially the oil market, is expected to take a considerable hit, with major companies withdrawing from the Iranian market. Total (France), which is currently engaged in an attempt to secure a sanctions waiver from the US, is expected to hand over its shares of the South Pars oil field to the Chinese state-owned company CNPC. According to reports, Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) plans to stop imports from Iran before the 180 day ‘winding down’ period, due to significant exposure to US financial systems. Lukoil, a Russian enterprise, has also put its plans of investing in Iran on hold soon after US announced its withdrawal. Danish shipping group A P Moller Maersk, the world’s largest oil shipping container firm, ceased operations in Iran.

Under such circumstances experts have expressed concern over the deal entirely falling apart and Iran resuming its nuclear program. However, the recent revocation of sanctions imposed on ZTE has been cited as an example of possible negotiations with the Trump administration with respect to secondary sanctions on Iran.

The punitive measures imposed on ZTE by the United States prevented it from accessing US market for finance or supplies as a result of which it soon announced a shut down of its international operations. Simultaneously, national security concerns were also raised in the US regarding remote surveillance through ZTE equipment.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration decided to take back the injunctions imposed on ZTE in exchange of a $1 billion fine, $400 million in escrows as insurance against future fines and a promise to replace the executive board members within 30 days of the deal being signed. As a show of disapproval, the Senate Banking committee in the US had earlier voted in an overwhelming majority to put in place measures that would prevent Trump from unilaterally revoking the sanctions imposed on ZTE. The president also faced overwhelming bipartisan criticism in the Congress regarding the alleged threat to national security and the precedence it would set with respect to America’s larger policy towards Iran.

One of the many discourses around the ZTE sanctions drop has been regarding the creation of a model that can possibly be used by other signatory states to receive waivers and accommodations and continue their businesses in Iran, thereby weakening the sanctions regime, often referred to as ‘maximum pressure’, that the Trump administration is trying to create. Notably, Total, has begun lobbying the White House for a sanctions waiver over their South Pars oil field development project.

However the Trump administration put speculations to rest by continuing to maintain a harsh rhetoric over the Iran nuclear issue, putting forth its plans for an alternative ‘better’ deal as elucidated by the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. The latest sanctions slapped on Iranian entities and individuals for alleged human rights violations and export of terrorism at the end of last month only reiterated the hardliner stance that the US government is presently taking with respect to the West Asian nation.

Although the ZTE deal could potentially be interpreted as a break in the unrelenting sanction regime adopted by the Trump administration, the aforementioned recent development indicates that it is far-fetched to assume that it marks a change in US policies towards Iran and JCPOA.  It is not an inflection in the Trump administration’s narrative towards Iran and may not prove to be a channel to renegotiate the nuclear deal with US. It should perhaps rather be seen in the ambit of the ongoing trade negotiations between US and China and the momentous Kim-Trump nuclear summit in Singapore. However the interesting takeaway from the ZTE episode is that the Trump administration has clearly demonstrated that it does not hold the same commitments to its sanctions when it comes to the Chinese as it does for Iran.

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China’s Social Credit System: Descent into an Orwellian era?

Ms. Sharanya Menon, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

In 2016, lawyer Li Xiaolin was unable to book plane tickets for his impending journey. An enquiry revealed the cause to be the insincere apology submitted by him to the court. The apology, which had been ordered by the court, had been deemed insincere because it had been submitted on April Fool’s day. The result: Li Xiaolin was placed on a government blacklist that barred him from accessing services as per the bold, ambitious new governance system of China, the Social Credit System.

This incident has drawn comparisons to a recent episode from the British science fiction show, Black Mirror which depicted a society that rated people based on their social interactions with others. The Social Credit System is a Chinese Government initiative which aims to assign a score to all its citizens based on a myriad of factors. The Planning Outline of the system, which was released in 2014 by the State Council, threw light on this upcoming system which aims to “establish the idea of sincerity culture [using] encouragement to keep trust and constraints against breaking trust”. To achieve this, the system will monitor the individuals based on their internet activities, personal shopping habits and rather innocuous behavioural tendencies of its people. The system, by seeding all available data and information across databases, will create a comprehensive record on all citizens and it will showcase all the activities that the individual engages in. Thus, the record will be the basis for the assigned score and will determine citizens’ employment opportunities, their access to loans and even potential romantic partners. The system will not be restricted to citizens but will also include business enterprises and industries.

Eight private companies have been provided with licenses to start pilots and experimental phases in regions. The most notable of them is Sesame Credit which is a subsidiary of Chinese retail giant, Alibaba. The final system that will be instituted might draw on the pilots designed by the private companies or might be entirely different.

The Social Credit System has been presented as the panacea to the widespread issue of mistrust in society and the lack of “sincerity” among the Chinese. The promise of a good score and subsequent benefits would incentivise the citizens to work to attain and maintain a good score. The threat of a bad score will act as a check on undesirable behaviour. Thus, incentivised good behaviour and actions will ensure that the underlying issue of mistrust and insincerity will be tackled tactfully.

While the Social Credit System is soon becoming a reality in China, in India, the Aadhar system is attempting to achieve something similar and parallels between the two systems can be drawn. The Aadhar, a 12-digit unique number, functions as an identity proof for residents of the country and is being modelled by the government to be the solution for all issues related to identity fraud plaguing the country. This system acts as a platform for the government to access all records and information available on all its residents. Therefore, the implementation of Aadhar has incited debates on privacy and data security across the country.

The dominant narrative that is being woven by the governments in both countries revolves around national interest and security. The narrative builds on these themes by asserting that the entry into the digital era and digitization is what is required for the countries to finally assert themselves and reclaim their rightful positions in the world order.

The government in India, by introducing welfare schemes that include Aadhar, is creating a system that necessitates Aadhar be the foundation of welfare and governance. Further, like the Social Credit System in China, the Aadhar integrates all available information on the individuals and as a result the individual loses complete control over any form of information or data that is available on them. The Social Credit System in China has been designed as a surveillance apparatus designed to exert control over the citizens and to construct the “ideal citizen”.

Therefore, the Chinese government is very subtly weaving together the notion of an ‘ideal citizen’ and in the process also reworking the conception of what it is to be a citizen and the relationship they enjoy with the state. China has always maintained administrative control over her population through the Hukou system which has been used to actively determine and limit where a person can live. Therefore, the Hukou system predicted an individual’s opportunities and prospects and therefore could be seen as a precursor to the Social Credit System.

The Social Credit System might be straight out of an Orwellian nightmare, but it shows how a country like China, always known to assert control over her citizens is devising new mechanisms to continue doing so. The Social Credit System warrants several questions to be raised; does the implementation of the system signal a shift towards a Big Data driven governance backed by the state? How does this model aim to accommodate the rights of the citizens and negotiate with the state’s need to survey its citizens? At this point, only time will tell.

India and North Korea: time for a reset?

Amb. Anil Wadhwa, Senior Fellow & Cluster Leader, VIF

General VK Singh, the Indian Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs was in North Korea from 15- 16 May 2018. Many have raised eyebrows on the timing of this visit, especially since the last ministerial visit from India to North Korea was in 1998. High-level contact between the two countries, however, have been maintained sporadically, and North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong was in New Delhi in 2015. Despite the history of Pakistan and North Korea collaboration in the nuclear and missile fields in the past, Indian and North Korean delegations have been meeting regularly on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit and related meetings. A major thread binding the two together has been India’s food aid to North Korea, which has been reeling under international sanctions and pressure due to its pariah status.

The last few years have seen unprecedented rhetoric from North Korea, matched by equally strong words from the United States, followed by increased sanctions, as the North embarked on an acceleration in the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.  India had to follow the sanctions route of the United Nations and USA, and its bilateral trade with North Korea fell from US$ 209 million in 2015-16 to US$ 130 in 2016-17. In line with UN sanctions, India banned all trade with North Korea except food and medicine. Following a gazette notification which incorporated the sanctions imposed since 2006, all trade of exports of defence, space and technology, training etc. was banned, and a ban imposed on officials suspected to be involved in nuclear proliferation. Bank account of North Korean diplomats in India were restricted, and there were curbs on the procurement of coal, minerals and other materials from North Korea. The Indian embassy in Pyongyang, however, has continued to function.

The winds are changing on the Korean peninsula. There has been a rapprochement between North and South, and expectations have been raised for a meeting of Kim Jong Un with Trump. The proposed meeting on 12 June in Singapore has slipped into the realm of doubt and the proposed official level meeting between North and South Korean officials have also not happened, with North Korea blaming US officials of proposing a “Libya style” denuclearization proposal on the North, without going into substantive discussions. While the North Koreans have signalled a desire for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the North Korean view will be that it must be done on a reciprocal, phased manner with guarantees that there will be no regime change in North Korea.

India has trained North Korean scientists under the UN COPUS programme at its Dehradun facility, has collaborated with the North in the agricultural field, and its cultural troupes have paid continuous visits to North Korea. Besides food aid, Indian pharmaceuticals are popular in North Korea due to their generic nature and consequently, cheaper prices. The fact that India was one of the top three trading partners of North Korea before the sanctions is testimony to the fact that the commodities traded are complementary.

A major achievement of General VK Singh’s visit was the assurance he received on the possible collaboration and technology transfer between North Korea and Pakistan which the North Koreans said was not in the realm of possibility, given the close relationship between India and North Korea. But the purpose of the visit at this stage also seems to be India’s desire to play a role in the opening of the North Korean economy, and participation in the reform of its dismal economy once there is a thaw with the outside world which now looks likely. India can quickly ramp up its exports of agriculture, steel products and pharmaceuticals and , and restart imports of North Korea iron and other metals. General Singh met with Vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Peoples Assembly Kim Yong Dae, Culture Minister Pak Chung Nam and Foreign Minister Choe Hui Chol. They agreed to strengthen people to people contacts through culture, cooperate in vocational training, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, promotion of yoga and traditional medicine. India can quickly ramp up its exports, and look at possible investments in the metallurgical sector which it has been offered in the past. Above all, India must be engaged in the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and ensure that there is no proliferation of nuclear or missile technologies from North Korea in our neighbourhood.

From Hurling Abuses to Summit Diplomacy: What Factors are Driving Kim Jong-un?

Divya Tyagi, Research Intern, Institute of Chinese Studies

Kim Jong-un’s new year speech (saehae yeonseol) kick-started an accelerated pace of political shifts in the Korean Peninsula. With the emphasis on creating a ‘peaceful environment’ on the Peninsula, Kim surprised the world with his turnabout from hurling abuses to proposing peace talks. But the question arises, why has he changed his stance and what could be the possible reason behind this sudden shift in Kim’s approach.

If we take lessons from history then, the Panmunjom declaration might just be yet another disappointment. The summit of 27 April 2018 was the third Inter-Korean summit after the Korean war. During the summit of 2000, images of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il (father of Kim Jong-un) shaking hands and clinking champagne glasses covered the news, as the two leaders signed a “broad agreement to work toward peace and reunification.”[1] The second summit came in 2007 after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. Similarly, in hopes of finding a negotiated solution regarding North Korea’s pulling out of Non-Proliferation Treaty (2003), six-party negotiations were initiated which again came to a stalemate after Pyongyang pulled out in 2009. So, there is a sense of deja-vu as North-Korea once again shows the willingness to come to the negotiating table with the concerned parties. The script of the present scenario can be seen as a repetition of the past but, the motive behind the benevolent approach of Kim can be speculated to have manifold reasons.

Breathing Space from the Strangulating Sanctions

Economic sanctions are not a rarity for North Korea after it conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. These sanctions were tightened in 2017 and with it’s all weather ally, China, actively supporting this time, compelled Kim Jong-un to embark on his 2018 ‘charm offensive’. There have been glimpses in the new year’s speech of Kim and the 2018 Parliamentary budget report indicating the damage the sanctions have made on the country’s economy. The North Korean supreme leader in his new year’s speech alluded that sanctions had affected the country’s economy. Likewise, the Premier of North Korea, Pak Pong Ju’s speech during the 6th session of the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) on 11 April 2018 mentioned ‘externally imposed obstacles’ twice, referring to “unprecedented massive challenges” and “vicious sanctions and pressure manoeuvres.” Both leaders acknowledged that economic sanctions were strangulating the North Korean economy, and that might have compelled Kim to rethink his approach, towards its southern neighbour in particular.

Victory on the Nuclear Front

Five years after announcing his Byungjin Policy in 2013, Kim Jong-un has declared North Korea as a nuclear state. Byungjin policy is his signature national strategy and, the successor to his father’s Songun policy (1994). Under Byungjin, Kim pledged to the success of North Korea’s parallel pursuit of a nuclear deterrence and economic development. Now that he claims the successful completion of making North Korea a nuclear state, shifting his focus to economic development seems the only logical choice. The transition of North Korea into a de facto nuclear state has also increased the confidence of Kim in global power standing. The idea of negotiating on an equal footing because of the nuclear weapons can also be considered as a valid motivating factor for Kim to shift to diplomatic negotiations, and aim to pressurize the opposing party agree to his favourable terms.

Laying the Groundwork for Reforms?

Kim Jong-un has in the past tried the ‘stick’ version of diplomacy by hurling abuses and threatening the US and maybe now, equipped with a sense of security because of the nuclear arsenal, he is shifting to ‘carrot’ version of diplomacy, desiring the end result to be, the acceptance of North Korean regime. In his six years of rule, if anything, Kim Jong-un has proved that he has ‘plans’. Starting from Byungjin Policy, aggressive pursuance of nuclear weapons and eradicating any possible competition, Kim is strategically bringing reforms in the regime beneath the guise of continuity. The survival of the regime is of paramount importance to the leader and Kim knows it can be achieved only when the regime’s legitimacy is not under external threat.

One thing that can be said with certainty is that the Panmunjom summit was definitely a historic and impressive day in the history of the Peninsula. From smiling faces of both the leaders, to the promises of a “new era of peace” (pyeonghwaui saeloun sidae) the summit was a success in terms of public diplomacy. However, with big powers like China and United States involved, shaping a new era of peace will not be easy, especially when the objectives of the involved parties are not in tandem with each other’s. The difference of “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation” stated by South Korea in accordance with US, and Kim Jong-un’s “phased and synchronised denuclearisation” can and probably will be the cause of friction in the momentum of this positive development.

This budding North-South bonhomie will be further put to test in the upcoming Kim-Trump meeting, to be held in Singapore next month. With both Kim and Trump having a flair for unpredictability and aggressive approach, it would be interesting to observe how the two leaders work towards ‘solving’ decades-long conflict.

Note

[1] The two leaders adopted a joint peace declaration after the three-day meeting, agreeing to work towards independent unification and humanitarian and economic cooperation. For more, see:  https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf

China in Africa: An Image Makeover is Underway

Dr. Veda Vaidyanathan, Research Associate, Institute of Chinese Studies

It was late afternoon in Ethiopia, I scrambled onto a bus filled with University students and found a seat at the back, near the window. As the bus meandered through traffic in Addis Ababa, the noises of the city was drowned out by the loud Amharic music playing on the radio. A young girl wanted to know why Indian women wore bindi’s – when I handed her a few packets from my reserve gift collection – she asked me if I could give her Bollywood DVD’s instead. An hour or two into our drive, the bus slowed down, trudged uphill and finally stopped. Without a groan or complaint, people picked up their bags and began to alight. “We need to get off the bus and walk to the top of the hill”, someone explained as he walked past.

There we were- in the stunning Ethiopian countryside, a horde of people, some quiet others singing, making our way to the top of the hill. “Does this happen every time?” I asked the student accompanying me for the trip. “Oh yes, it’s a Chinese bus.” He replied matter-of-factly. “What’s that supposed to mean?” I prodded. “Oh its terrible quality, it has a weak engine, the chairs and the cushions will come off soon too” he replied grinning. I asked him why we did not take another bus, one which had a stronger engine perhaps, “but there aren’t any other buses” he responded.

As we reached the last hairpin bend, there were large Chinese characters painted on a granite wall. As I stopped to take a picture, they explained that the well-laid tar road was new and built by a Chinese company. It used to be a narrow, uneven dirt road, dangerous during the rains and it took a lot of time to reach the villages on the top.  As we spoke, a woman in a beautiful white habesha kemi walked beside us carrying a pot of water. That journey, I assume, from the water source at the bottom of the hill to the top, was made easier by the broad winding new road.

Many instances like these provided a glimpse into the layered and complicated perception of China in Africa today. As Chinese migrants and companies make their presence felt across the cityscapes and country sides, the African attitude about them is quietly evolving. While acknowledging that Chinese exports to Africa are of inferior quality or that working conditions in Chinese companies are harsh or frustration with Chinese bosses who don’t take into account local sensibilities- conversations with young Africans in Kenya, Ethiopia and beyond highlight a palpable unease. However despite a range of criticism levelled against Chinese firms and violence targeting Chinese managers, most often than not- China is viewed as a provider of options. Sure, the Chinese bus was sub-standard, but at least there was a road and a bus!

Afrobarometer- a pan African, nonpartisan research network conducted a survey in 2016 of 36 African countries about China in Africa and concluded that “Africans rank the United States and China No. 1 and 2, respectively, as development models for their own countries.” Interestingly, in three of five African regions, “China either matches or surpasses the United States in popularity as a development model.” Additionally, “In terms of their current influence, the two countries are outpaced only by Africa’s former colonial powers.”

This shift in perception is by no means abrupt; Africa has been on China’s foreign policy radar with a twenty eight year old tradition of the Chinese foreign minister visiting Africa, in addition to a range of senior officials regularly travelling to the continent. Development Reimagined, the first Kenyan wholly foreign owned enterprise in China, recently published their first infographic on Chinese leaders traveling to Africa. According to their study, the Chinese leadership has made 79 visits to 43 different African countries over the past 10 years and no other country can match this degree of diplomatic exchange with countries in the continent.

Beyond the Chinese ‘Charm Offensive’, data from the AidData dataset – curated by a research lab at the College of William & Mary – point out that seven of the top 10 recipients of Chinese Aid are in Africa. They also drew attention to the fact that contrary to popular perception, Chinese ODA generally goes to poorer countries and it does not appear to go disproportionately to authoritarian or corrupt regimes in the continent.

In addition to Aid, since 2009 China has been Africa’s largest trading partner and in 2016, bilateral trade between China and Africa was valued at USD149.1 billion, Chinese non-financial direct investment in the continent amounted to USD3 billion and the contractual value of newly signed contracted projects reached USD65.2 billion.

The language utilized by China while crafting its policies for Africa have strong moralistic undertones indicating selflessness and altruism. While some Chinese scholars agree with this premise, others insist that it is a mutually beneficial ‘win-win partnership’. African scholars remain divided with some viewing China as having increased their options, while others remain wary of their increasing influence.

Regardless of the motivations, fact remains that a new generation of Africans are becoming increasingly comfortable with a powerful China and the ‘China model’ of growth and development. Not only has China has become the most popular destination for Anglophone African students studying abroad, there are over 40 Confucius Institutes (CI) in Africa. A recent Quartz report mentioned that at a Mandarin speaking proficiency test conducted in Lusaka, a Zambian student was asked what her dream was, and she claimed “Wode mengxiang shi Zhongguo” (“My dream is China”). This acceptance of China and aspiration to be like China, the result of years of Beijing’s proactive engagement in the continent, could perhaps be one of the biggest successes for China in its contemporary foreign policy.

Wang Qishan: Xi Jinping’s Man Friday

Bhim B. Subba, Research Associate, Institute of Chinese Studies

On 17th March 2018 Wang Qishan got elected as the Vice-President of PRC succeeding Li Yuanchao. This is major political news. Wang, 69 who resigned from the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at the 19th National Party Congress in October 2017 polled 2969 votes in the total of 2980 deputies and making a comeback indicates a boost to Xi Jinping’s power. At the sidelines of the lianghui- ‘two meetings,’ the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – Xi emphasised that ‘human talent’ as  one of the ‘Three Firsts’ in Xi Jinping Thought (人才是第一资源 rencai shi di yi ziyuan). He was almost certainly referring to bringing Wang Qishan as state vice-president, a ‘special talent’ which Xi did not want to waste and which can help him maintain his grip on party’s anti-corruption campaign and control over the 1.39 billion strong party-state.

Although Wang’s continuation as a PBSC member was much debated in the run-up to the party congress in fall 2017, his non-selection as a Central Committee member was not surprising. The party adhering to the ‘7-up-8-down’ principle (七上八下 qi shang ba xia) led to retirement of all  PBSC members above 68 years. But with Xi’s continuing emphasis on party building ( 党建设dang jianshe) and anti-corruption campaign (反腐败运动 fan fubai yundong), a trusted lieutenant like Wang Qishan became indispensable for Xi Jinping. Hence, what better than Wang becoming a ‘deputy’ occupying the state vice-president’s post, a ceremonial position. With Wang, the position becomes a power centre to reckon with in the coming future. It is also speculated that Wang is attending closed-door PBSC deliberations even after his retirement. Thus, getting elected as a National People’s Congress (NPC) deputy from Hunan and a member of the 190-member NPC Presidium, Wang’s elevation as Xi’s deputy was on the cards. Wang’s seating position in the NPC presidium was a clear message of Wang’s comeback. Recently, he was also among the select few Chinese leaders who met with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un when the latter had a secret visit to Beijing.

 From ‘Worker-Peasant-Soldier Student’ to Financial Honcho!

Wang Qishan, a Shanxi native, who joined the CPC in 1983 was also a ‘sent down youth’ during the Cultural Revolution. A student of modern history, he did everything but history when he joined the Rural Development Research Center after becoming a party member. He was one of the early beneficiaries of the reform period’s ‘successors training program’ where scores of young elites were recruited in the party-state echelons. Marrying Yao Mingshan (姚明珊),daughter of Yao Yilin, a conservative vice-premier under Zhao Ziyang, Wang’s political career rose steadily as pioneer of rural and agriculture reforms.

Later, Wang headed prominent national banks including as a governor of China Construction Bank (1994-97) and vice-governor of People’s Bank of China (1993-94). He was also instrumental in establishing China International Capital Corp (CICC) China’s first investment bank and served in Zhu Rongji’s cabinet. Even in the Hu-Wen era, Wang’s financial acumen was employed in negotiating the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue post-2008 financial crisis. Given that they are old US hands, President Xi can also delegate to the Wang Qishan and Liu He combine in engaging with the US especially after Trump’s call for trade war with China.

China’s Crisis Man to Anti-Corruption Czar

Wang’s new position as deputy to Xi also shows how these two individuals’ careers led them to working together in Beijing. Wang Qishan was appointed as the vice-mayor of Beijing post-2004 SARS outbreak, when he successfully helped the state machinery to check the deadly epidemic then referred to as ‘China’s Chernobyl.’ However, it was in mid-2000s when Xi was state vice president and Wang Qishan was Beijing City Mayor in-charge of preparations for Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics that their friendship flourished and they shared an amicable working relationship. As PBSC members in 2012, their partnership led to the party rectification through anti-corruption campaign. Since then, Wang  has become Xi’s ‘fire brigade chief’ (救火队长 jiuhuo duizhang)   or ‘samasya nivarak.’

With a trusted confidant like Wang, Xi has successfully sidelined many of his political detractors. Investigations against Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua and Sun Zhengcai were more dealt within the ambit of anti-party activities than in the form of political persecution. From 2012-17, from the party-centre to local levels, and in state agencies, SOEs and in financial institutions, the anti-graft campaigns have been successful in snaring many ‘tigers’ and flies. In 2017, alone 160,000 officials were investigated for graft and party indiscipline.

The amendment of the PRC constitution to remove term limits for the President and Vice-President at the 13th National People’s Congress recently, reinforced both Xi and Wang as the No 1 and 2 in the power hierarchy. Wang’s comeback as Xi’s ‘trouble-shooter’ must be closely watched especially after Xi’s becoming a so-called people’s leader’ (人民领袖renmin lingxiu). One needs to ponder who the ‘crisis man’ represents — Xi’s Man Friday or the party-state’s? The larger question however, is of how Xi will address this ‘revolving door’ appointment of a once retired party colleague and the ramifications to Chinese elite politics in coming years.

 

 

 

Wang Huning: China’s Amit Shah

Jabin T. Jacob, PhD, Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies

If Shah’s job is to help Modi do the electoral math and draw up strategies to win elections, it is Wang’s job to help create the narrative that legitimizes Xi Jinping in power in an authoritarian system.

As the National People’s Congress in China cleared a constitutional amendment on Sunday allowing President Xi Jinping to remain president for life, here is a look at Xi’s closest confidante and politburo member Wang Huning, who is also known to be the brain behind President Xi.

Wang has been speechwriter and ideologue to three successive General Secretaries of the CPC –- Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and now Xi. Many key concepts for these three leaders have been fashioned and refined under Wang’s watch in the Party’s Central Policy Research Office since 2002 and later as a member of the Central Secretariat.

Indeed, one might wonder if China’s – and President Xi Jinping’s — slow turn towards a more assertive stance has not been influenced also by Wang’s personal ideological proclivities conveyed through the mouths of China’s leaders.

In practical terms, Wang Huning is to Xi Jinping what Amit Shah is to Narendra Modi. If Shah’s job is to help Modi do the electoral math and draw up strategies to win elections, it is Wang’s job to help create the narrative that legitimises Xi Jinping in power in an authoritarian system Continue reading “Wang Huning: China’s Amit Shah”